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Generally, silence cannot be construed as acceptance of an
offer,13 for "assent" which is purely mental is too ambiguous.' 4
The offeror has no power to force the offeree to act in order to
reject the offer. 5 The general rule is that delay by an insurer in
acting upon an application for insurance in itself is not to be
construed as an acceptance of the offer." But the silent retention
of a renewal policy by an insured will operate as acceptance where
previous dealings -an shown.' 7  Likewise, unreasonable delay in
notifying an applicant of rejection of a solicited policy will bind
the insurer.'8  Evidence of usage in a particular trade is admis-
sible with other circumstances to show an assent from silence."
The burden of proof is on the party who asserts the existence of
the policy."
The plaintiff in the instant case simply failed to show facts
sufficient to bring his case within the exceptions to the general
rule.
Statute of Frauds
An oral agreement may be valid as such, yet unenforceable
because by its terms it cannot be fully performed within one year
from its making.21  In Nat Nal Service Stations v. Wolf,22 the
action was for money due upon an oral contract which provided
that so long as the plaintiff purchased his requirements of gasoline
through the defendant, plaintiff would be paid a certain rebate.
The defendant set up the Statute of Frauds in answer and moved
for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals, three judges dis-
senting, held that the agreement did not fall within the scope of
13. Lee v. Woodward, 259 N. Y. 149, 181 N. E. 81 (1932).
14. Mactier v. Frith, 6 Wend. 103, 119 (N. Y. 1830); White v. Corlies, 46 N. Y.
467 (1871) ; 1 CoRBnr, op. cit. § 72 (1951).
15. More v. N. Y..B. F. Ins. Co., 130 N. Y. 537, 547, 29 N. E. 757, 759 (1892).
16. More v. N. Y. B. F. Ins. Co., supra n. 15; VANcE, INSTJRANCE § 64 (1930).
17. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Ehrlich, 122 Misc. 682, 203 N. Y.. Supp. 434
(Sup. Ct. 1924).
18. Thompson v. Postal Life Ins. Co., 226 N. Y. 363, 123 N. E. 750 (1919).
19. Rose Inn Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 258 N. Y. 51, 179 N. E. 256
(1930).
20. Lavine v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 260 N. Y. 399, 410, 183 N. E. 897, 900 (1933).
21. N. Y. Pmts. PRoP. LAw § 31 (1.): "Every agreement, promise or undertak-
ing is void, unless it or some note or memorandum thereof be in writing, and subscribed
by the party to be charged therewith, or by his lawful agent, if such agreement, promise
or undertaking; (1.) By its terms is not to be performed within one year from the
making thereof. . ." "Year" is defined in GENmIAL CONSTRUCTION LAW § 58.
22. 304 N. Y. 332, 107 N. E. 2d 473 (1952).
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the one year section since it was a contract "at will," with the
right in either party to avoid performance indefinitely or to
terminate the relationship by notice. The court upheld the com-
plaint on the ground that the suit was actually on a series of
executed contracts. The dissent limited its review to the question
whether the agreement as alleged fell within the Statute. It found
that by the terms of the contract performance on the part of
the defendant was to extend beyond one year, and that he was
powerless to bring the agreement to an end within that time.2
Will part performance of an oral contract take it outside the
operation of the one year section? The majority rule is that if
either party to a bilateral contract cannot perform his promise
within one year, then the whole agreement is within the Statute
so long as it remains bilateral.-" But where the oral agreement
at its inception is unilateral,2 5 or has become unilateral by reason
of full performance on one side,28 the section does not apply even
though the performance of the remaining promise may require
over one year."7 This is known as the "part performance rule,"
New York, in the minority, requires that full performance within
a year be possible by both sides, whether the contract is bilateral
or unilateral.2 Thus, in New York, the fact that one side has
fully performed is irrelevant to the enquiry whether the oral
agreement is within the year section.
What does full performance mean? According to the New
York rule, performance "is simply carrying out the contract by
doing what it requires or permits. " 29  Thus, if the oral contract
expressly permits one 0 or both I" of the parties to bring their
23. 304 N. Y. at 339, 107 N. E. 2d at 478: "Regardless of whether, or when, plain-
tiff gave, or defendants accepted, any orders for gasoline, plaintiff's right to give such
orders and defendants' obligation to pay the agreed amount, by the terms of that treaty,
continue for an indefinite time. There was nothing that either party could do, within
a year, or within any other agreed-upon period, to bring the arrangement to an end."
24. 2 Wn.LSToN, op. cit. § 498; RESTATEmmE-T, CONTRACTS § 198 (1932) ; 2 CoRBNm,
op. cit. § 456.
25. 2 CoaIN, op. 4t. § 456.
26. 2 CoaBN, op. cit. § 457.
27. 2 CORBIN, op. cit. § 457, 458.
28. Martocci v. Greater New York Brewery Inc., 301 N. Y. 57, 92 N. E. 2d 887
(1950) ; Cohen v. Bartgis Bros. Co., 264 App. Div. 260, 35 N. Y. S. 2d 206, aft'd, 289
N. Y. 846, 47 N. E. 2d 443 (1943).
29. (Italics added) Blake v. Voigt, 134 N. Y. 69, 72, 31 N. E. 256, 259 (1892).
30. Spector Co. v. Serutin Co., 60 N. Y. S. 2d 212 (Sup. Ct 1946).
31 Blake v. Voigt, suPra n. 29.
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relationship to an end within a year, it is not within the Statute.
So also, where the agreement is subject to an expressed contin-
gency which may happen and end the contract within a year, 2 or
where the promise is in the alternative and either promise could
be performed within a year, the Statute is inapplicable. Every
other termination of the agreement, unless expressly permitted,
is a destruction or breach of the contract but not performance.
Where the duty to perform may be avoided beyond one year,
as when contingent upon the acts of a third party, the Statute
still applies since the avoidance of performance is not perform-
ance. 4  Even where the possibility to avoid performance is in the
control of the defendant, it is not considered equivalent to an ex-
pressed option to terminate. 35 It may not be exercised arbitrar-
ily-6 The fact that the defendant in the instant case could avoid
performance by not accepting orders appears to be irrelevant.
The promises in the Cohen,0 and Martoccis8 cases which were held
to be within the Statute are not materially different from the
promise of the defendant in the instant case. However, the court
divided over the question of the kind of contract involved. The
majority found that the parties never bound themselves to any-
thing while the dissent was of the opinion that the parties had
bound themselves for an indefinite time.
32. International Ferry Co. v. American Fidelity Co., 207 N. Y. 350, 101 N. E.
160 (1913).
33. 2 WILLIsToN, op. cit. § 498.
34. Martocci v. Greater New York Brewery Inc., supra n. 28. The promise of thedefendant was to pay the plaintiff a certain commission on all sales made by the de-fendant to a third party. The court stated: "The mere cessation of orders from
Lorillard to defendant would not alter the contractual relationship between the parties;
it would not constitute performance; plaintiff would still be in possession of his con-tractual right, though it may have no monetary value, immediately or ever." 301 N. Y.
at 63, 92 N. E. 2d at 887.
35. Cohen v. Bartgis Bros. Co., supra n. 28. The promise of the defendant wasto pay the plaintiff a commission at anytime on all orders placed by a third party.
The defendant could not continually refuse to accept orders and thus avoid performance
forever. The court stated: "Unlike contracts which require the performance of a
single act which may or may not be executed within a year, the contract here requiresthe defendant, for an unlimited period of time, to pay commissions on orders accepted
from Resolute Paper Products Corp. and, therefore, is impossible of performance with-
in a year." 264 App. Div. at 261, 35 N. Y. S. 2d at 208.
36. Warren C. & M. Co. v. Holbrook, 118 N. Y. 586, 23 N. E. 908 (1890); c.Hedeman v. Fairbanks, Morse & Co., 286 N. Y. 240, 250, 36 N. E. 2d 129, 133 (1941) ;Taylor v. E. M. S. Co., 124 N. Y. 184, 187, 26 N. E. 314, 316 (1891) ; 1 ComN, op. cit.
§150, 162, 165.
37. Supra n. 35.
38. Supra n. 34.
